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Cicero and Spiritual Rebirth

CICERO AND SPIRITUAL REBIRTH

1. Introduction - the "self" as value base?

In this young but weary twenty-first century, major changes are taking shape, such as rapid advancements in technology, disappearing privacy, demographic and geopolitical shifts as well as shifts in morality and values.

In his book *Meanings of Life*, Baumeisterⁱ discusses the replacement of classical values by the "self" as value base and refers among others to Christopher Lasch, who viewed modern society as a "culture of narcissism." Baumeister writes:

"... the modern narcissist is dependent on others for validation of his or her personal worth – but aging reduces this self-worth. Aging makes one's skills and knowledge obsolete, depletes one's "promise" or "potential", degrades one's physical attractiveness ... This modern, narcissistic individual does not place a great deal of value on the future, posterity, historical continuity, or other broader contexts that might supply value to the present. The narrowed emphasis on the self as the sole source of value leaves one vulnerable to depression and panic as the self loses the qualities that will make others admire it. Lasch's perspective is entirely compatible with the view of the self as a major source of value today. In his words, "self-absorption defines the moral climate of contemporary society ..."

The "final product" is an individual which is:

"highly insecure, dependent on others for approval, desperately seeking for intense emotional experiences to fill a perceived inner void, full of suppressed rage, and cut off from broader values and contexts that could supply meaning to life and that could make aging and death more acceptable."ⁱⁱⁱ

What does an antipode look like? According to Cicero, an example of the classical philosophical, religious and legal thought, a system of values is the necessary foundation for individuals and societies alike to withstand the strains of existence and flourish. Recent developments in life sciences in psychological, evolutionary and moral research corroborate the notion of an inherent moral compass, which strikingly parallels the deliberations in Cicero's works. This is a noteworthy advancement, deserving of elaboration. It is the subject of this article, in which I will:

- Outline Book I of Cicero's *The Laws* - his ideas of the "universal law" as a way of life, its meaning, functions and values according to Cicero, i.e., what I call "Cicero's virtuous circle." I will also make references to *The Republic*, Cicero's other great work, as well as other texts of Cicero, which share many ideas and premises with *The Laws*. The expression "virtuous circle" might sound somewhat grandiose but it is in fact a code of practice against nihilism and chaos, as I presently argue.
- Sketch how Cicero's ideas of inherent morality and moral development are being corroborated by modern moral research. I will briefly delineate the major theses and precepts of some excellent examples - the works of John Mikhail, Liane Young and Frans de Waal.
- Briefly summarize in a conclusion the essence of Cicero's ideas.

Apart from the outstanding quality of his works, it is precisely the issues that he has been criticized for that make a study of his texts rewarding - his alleged lack of an "own" philosophical system and an eclectic approach - his deliberations often cross systems and schools of thought, dissect, analyze and compare them, providing a rich, wide-ranging philosophical environment. Cicero's work arguably contains elements of Platonic, Sceptic and Stoic thought. Although Cicero was not a Stoic himself, he sympathized with many ideas of Stoicism.ⁱⁱⁱ

Written in times of great political and spiritual turmoil, just a couple of years before Caesar would cross the Rubicon and basically end the Roman Republic, the work breathes the inner upheaval and passion of an individual observing the chaos surrounding him and persistently trying to rekindle the ideas of bygone days.

2. Universal law and reason

Cicero fears moral corruption accompanied by constitutional corruption.^{iv} Regarding the latter Cicero writes in *The Republic*^v, Book III, at (34): "... when a state is destroyed, eliminated, and blotted out, it is rather as if ... this whole world were to collapse and pass away." Cicero states his aim in *The Laws*, Book I at (57) accordingly: "... to provide a code of living and a system of training for nations and individuals alike", i.e. to provide fundamental guidelines.

So how do Cicero's fundamental guidelines look like?

Central to Cicero's thought is the idea of *reason*, the acknowledgement that the universe functions according to rules and values, which can be discerned and understood rationally. Closely linked with it is the concept of "nature" or acting according to "universal nature." The human mind is capable of grasping, developing and adhering to reason. Cicero calls reason "a faculty which, when it has developed and become complete, is rightly called wisdom," *The Laws*, Book I at (22). Besides justice, courage and temperance, wisdom is of course one of the four major Stoic virtues.

According to Cicero's famous dictum in *The Republic*, Book III, at (33):

"...law in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature....This law cannot be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded. We cannot be exempted from this law by any decree of the Senate or the people; nor do we need anyone else to expound or explain it. There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one now and another in the future, but all peoples at all times will be embraced by a single and eternal and unchangeable law..."

For Stoics, the world, the cosmos was synonymous with divine and thus rational. The Stoics regarded its rationality as not different in kind from human rationality.^{vi} Accordingly, adjusting one's mind to divine rationality means taking on the virtues of God.^{vii} Living virtuously, i.e., guided by reason and values, means to elevate oneself beyond the "basic" life of instincts, thus making full use of one's own potential and in a way becoming a "superhuman" or "godlike."

Cicero states concisely in *The Laws*, Book I at (23):

"Since, then, there is nothing better than reason, and reason is present in both man and God, there is a primordial partnership in reason between man and God. But those who share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, we men must also be thought of as partners with the gods in law. Furthermore, those who share law share justice. Now those who share all these things must be regarded as belonging to the same state; and much the more so if they obey the same powers and authorities.

And they do in fact obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the allpowerful god. Hence this whole universe must be thought of as a single community shared by gods and men."

And at (25):

"There is, therefore, a similarity between man and God. Since that is so, what kinship, I ask you, can be closer or firmer?"

Cicero makes numerous references to "God" or "gods" throughout *The Laws* and *The Republic*; in fact, the notion permeates it. Did he literally mean deity or deities? The opinions on the topic of existence of deities were split, even in the ancient world, although Cicero obviously believed in traditional Roman gods. However, central to his thought is the idea of the proverbial *Einstein's God*, the acknowledgement that the universe functions according to a network of rules and values, which can be discerned and understood rationally.

Cicero proceeds to emphasize justice and discipline. He writes at (42) and (43):

"There is one, single, justice. It binds together human society and has been established by one, single, law ... A man who does not acknowledge this law is unjust, whether it has been written down anywhere or not. If justice is a matter of obeying the written laws and customs of particular communities, and if, as our opponents allege, everything is to be measured by self-interest, then a person will ignore and break the laws when he can, if he thinks it will be to his own advantage. This is why justice is completely non-existent, if it is not derived from nature, and if that kind of justice which is established to serve self-interest is wrecked by that same self-interest ... What room will there be for liberality, patriotism, and devotion; or for the wish to serve others or to show gratitude?"

The basis of justice is a measure of self-temperance and regard for others, thoughts echoed by modern morality research, as will be shown below. Its opposites are hedonism and egoism. In Book I at (33) Cicero posits:

"And Socrates was right to curse the man who first separated self-interest from justice; for that, he complained, was the source of everything pernicious."

3. Rejection of relativism in all its forms

Consequently, Cicero emphatically rejects relativism.

Cicero espouses that it is "insane" to suppose that the differences between a good law and a bad law or between virtues and vices are matters of opinion and not grounded in nature.

The "universal law" is not a human convention or something within human control.^{viii} According to Cicero, if the laws were validated by the orders of politicians, judges or "orders of peoples," then it would be just to rob, commit forgery or adultery if only it were approved by somebody, e.g. the populace. As Cicero puts it in Book I of *The Laws* at (44): "If there is such a power in the decisions and decrees of foolish people that they can overturn the nature of things by their votes, why do they not enact that things wicked and destructive should be deemed good and wholesome? And why is it that, if a law can make what is unjust just, it cannot turn evil into good?"

Thus, a philosopher who followed the dictates of the universal norms based on nature could well find himself violating the statutory rules or conventions of a morally corrupt society.^{ix} As a glaring example, he could serve the Nazi Germany during the twelve diabolical years of the "Third Reich."

In Book II of *The Laws* at (10) Cicero provides examples:

"Even though it was nowhere laid down that one man should stand on the bridge against the whole of the enemy's army and should order the bridge to be cut down behind him, we will continue to think that the famous Cocles performed that great deed according to the commands and dictates of bravery. And even if in the reign of Lucius Tarquinius there was no written law at Rome against acts of rape, nonetheless Sextus Tarquinius contravened that eternal law in violating Lucretia the daughter of Tricipitinus. For reason existed - reason derived from the nature of the universe, impelling people to right actions and restraining them from wrong."

In Book III of the *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* at (16) - (26)^x Cicero also explains the Stoic view of growth in virtue and moral development, a view that seems to be sympathetic to Cicero. According to it, people are ruled by their instincts in the beginning of their lives, by

their attachment to their selves and their relatives. Later, they mature and are able to exercise their reason, which should lead to an appreciation of virtue and a rejection of wrongness. Reason allows humans to attach value to things according to their real worth, in agreement with the nature of a rational, social being, whereby virtue is the highest product of rationality.

We will subsequently see that the stoic notion of "developmental moral growth" is being corroborated by modern moral research, whereby we begin our lives with a basic moral "toolkit," put in place by evolutionary forces, which we expand during later life stages and complete by means of reflection and reasoning (ideally).

According to Cicero in Book I of *The Laws* at (46) - (52), a mind not yet fully developed requires guidance: "In the case of our senses no parent or nurse or teacher or poet or stage-show distorts them, nor does popular opinion lead them away. For our minds, however, all kinds of traps are laid, either by the people just mentioned, who on receiving young untrained minds stain them as they please, or else by that power which lurks within, entwined with every one of our senses, namely pleasure, which masquerades as goodness but is in fact the mother of all ills. Seduced by her charms, our minds fail to see clearly enough the things that are naturally good, because those things lack the sweetness and exciting itch of pleasure."

He goes on to proclaim: "But it is in scorning and rejecting pleasure that goodness is most convincingly revealed."

Consequently, a prudent mind should strive after virtue and be assisted and guided in doing so. Anything else would be against reason. It will ultimately lead to corruption and destruction, of the individual and of the state. Again, Cicero gives a short enumeration of positives and negatives: restraint, temperance, self-control, modesty, decency, chastity and greed, lust, cowardice, dullness, stupidity and pleasure on the other hand. As stated above, moral excellence is reason fully developed, which is wisdom.

4. Cicero's "virtuous circle" - a cycle of spiritual renewal

What does Cicero's "virtuous circle" look like? The human mind has the capacity to discern and formulate the "universal law" by means of reason, a faculty provided by the universal nature. When people are born, they are ruled by their instincts. They mature and become

able to exercise their reason, which should lead to an appreciation for truth, the moral universals and a rejection of wrongness. They become capable of perfecting their reason. The perfected reason is wisdom. It is the reason of a vigorous thinker, who has gained a command of himself or herself.

The self-knowledge so obtained will enable a virtuous life, i.e., a purposeful and fulfilled life and a genuine freedom. The intrinsic value of virtue is the organization of life; it is not the episodic seeking of pleasure, which is the exact opposite of a purpose-giving order.

Cicero's concept of happiness is therefore distinct from the modern understanding of happiness. Cicero is looking to provide guidelines for a wise statesman and for a prudent citizen. The former should enact laws that are in accordance with nature, reason, and justice. Laws that not only regulate but also educate and can even facilitate a virtuous life.

Julia Annas provides a wonderful summary^{xi}:

"...law described....encouraging virtues and discouraging vices, and as forming a way of life and the characters of the people who live that life. It is at this point that we find that a code of law produces practices and a way of life which forms people's characters by encouraging some traits and discouraging others. We find, that is, that a code of law is not just a body of rules directing our *actions*, but also what structures a way of life and so forms *character*. Having made this connection, Cicero now concludes the book with an exposition of the importance of philosophy ... in the stricter sense of training yourself in ethics, physics and logic in order to acquire true wisdom. This is what is required to become a good person, and so a happy one."

Again, it is a universal system of values.^{xii} Andrew R. Dyck even denotes Book I of *The Laws* as "Cicero's anthropology."^{xiii}

5. Cicero's "virtuous circle" and modern scientific research

As stated at the top, modern scientific research, in particular biological and evolutionary moral research, speaks strongly in favour of Cicero's precepts.

a. Modern moral research

In recent decades, a new approach to the questions of morality has arisen. It treats morality as an empirical issue accessible to scientific study. I will presently give a brief overview of some of these studies.

(1) "Universal moral grammar"

This is the research project of John Mikhail, the "universal moral grammar," or "UMG," a study of human moral cognition^{xiv}. UMG derives its informational input from a number of sources, including psychology, linguistics, anthropology and cognitive neuroscience. UMG's hypothesis is that humans possess an innate moral faculty that is analogous to the language faculty, as postulated by Noam Chomsky.

UMG is predicated on two fundamental arguments. First, the mind contains a moral grammar, a complex set of rules and concepts, which, among other things, enables individuals to determine the deontic status of an infinite variety of acts. Secondly, the manner in which moral grammar is acquired implies that its attributes are innate, i.e., largely pre-determined by the inherent structure of the mind. Both arguments have direct parallels in the case of language.

Further, almost every natural language contains expressions of deontic concepts, such as *obligatory*, *permissible*, *forbidden*. Deontic logic, is moreover formalizable. Murder, rape, other types of aggression and legal distinctions based on causation, intention and voluntary behavior appear to be almost universal. Finally, recent brain research suggests the human brain contains a network of brain regions involved in moral cognition.

A fascinating aspect of UMG is research carried out with children. According to UMG, 3 to 4-year-old children are "intuitive lawyers," capable of drawing intelligent distinctions between similar cases of their intuitive jurisprudence, showing many characteristics of a well-developed legal code. They deploy the concept of intent to distinguish between two acts and are also capable of distinguishing moral violations like theft from mere social conventions (like inappropriate clothing) and use proportionality to determine suitable punishment for principals and accessories.

(2) The "taste bud theory"

To discuss is further the "taste bud theory" of moral growth, developed, among others, by Liane Young^{xv}.

Drawing on evidence from developmental psychology, the theory argues that moral development can be best explained by a theory focused on innate principles that are modified through social communication. The theory suggests babies are born with certain "pre-installed" intuitions, "taste buds," that provide the framework for a mature moral sense. These intuitions are later completed and perfected by cultural input, which regulates the sensitivity of the "buds" and the triggering factors. The intuitions about "right" and "wrong" are evolved and emerge early in development and continue to play a substantial role in the moral judgement of adults. The early emergence seems to hold true especially for harm-based and fairness-based^{xv} moral beliefs. Moral intuitions about harm and fairness develop rapidly and autonomously, i.e. even when there is a poverty of stimulus and are specialized at deontic rules or at actions causing distress. Accordingly, the hypothesis that certain moral foundations are innate receives substantial support.

Assessment of intentions plays a crucial role in evaluation of moral wrongness. According to studies, the right temporoparietal junction of the brain, "RTPJ," is involved in many moral judgements and is responsible for thinking about agents' mental states. Temporary disruption of the activity in this brain region leads to more permissible attitudes regarding attempted harms. Further, there is an association between lenience toward accidental harm and enhanced activity in the RTPJ during moral judgement. Studies demonstrate that intentional and accidental harm triggers apparent and surprisingly fast-arising spatial patterns of neural response within the RTPJ, attesting that humans automatically and immediately integrate information about intent into their harm-based moral judgements.

(3) The evolutionary building blocks of morality

This is a theory developed by Frans de Waal^{xvi}.

De Waal stresses the characteristics that humans share with animal primates, and argues that human morality has developed out of our animal background. According to de Waal, the behaviour of nonhuman primates shows the building blocks of morality are evolutionarily ancient.

De Waal sees morality as a product of human group-orientation, since humans require a support system for survival. Morality facilitates conflict-resolution and joint endeavors and thus places the common good above individual interests without completely denying them.

De Waal delineates the "moral domain" of human action as helping or (not) hurting, the two Hs being interconnected (i.e., sometimes not helping means hurting, e.g., when someone's life is in danger). Important resources with regard to the two Hs are food and mates, both subject to rules of possession, division and exchange. Things outside of these two Hs are outside the moral domain.

According to de Waal, there are three levels of morality, some of them humans share with animal primates like apes. Similar to Mikhail, de Waal sees parallels between the biological foundation of morality and language. A child is not born with a particular language, but with the ability to learn any language. In the same way, we are born to weigh moral options, absorb moral rules - a flexible system that revolves around "the same two Hs ... it always has."

The first level of morality consists of moral *sentiments* or the psychological building blocks of morality and is shared with other primates. This first level includes empathy, reciprocity, retribution, conflict resolution and fairness. This is the level of inherent ancient or evolutionary developed morality.

The divergence from other primates begins at the second level, the level of social pressure or community concern. The human group demands positive contributions from other group members and disapproves of deeds that undermine the social fabric. Humans can do so, even if their own interests are at stake. In line with the biologically conditioned commands of survival and reproduction, morality facilitates cooperation, which is beneficiary to everyone.

The third level is judgment and reasoning. At this level, the level of moral *reasoning*, comparisons with other animals are impossible. De Waal writes: "The desire for an internally consistent moral framework is uniquely human. We are the only ones to worry about why we think what we think." And further:

"We ... follow an internal compass, judging ourselves (and others) by evaluating the intentions and beliefs that underlie our own (and their) actions... I consider this level of morality, with its desire for consistency and "disinterestedness," and its careful

weighing of what one did against what one could or should have done, uniquely human."

Morality is not a recent civilizational "veneer." Neuroimaging shows that moral judgement involves a wide variety of brain areas, some extremely ancient. Neuroscience seems to be lending support to human morality as evolutionary anchored in mammalian society.

b. Modern authors on morality

Similar considerations are espoused by modern authors, for instance, Christine M. Korsgaard's in her essay "Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action."^{xvii}

Korsgaard's thesis is that the uniquely human consciousness of the grounds of our beliefs and actions is the source of human reason. She starts with the work of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin, who believed the capacity for normative self-government plays a crucial role in explaining the development of morality. She quotes Darwin, according to whom it is the basis for "that short but imperious word ought, so full of high significance."

The following passage delivers the essence of her arguments:

"... the capacity for normative self-government and the deeper level of intentional control that goes with it is probably unique to human beings. And it is in the proper use of this capacity - the ability to form and act on judgements of what we ought to do - that the essence of morality lies"

In her book *Eco-Republic: What the Ancients Can Teach Us About Ethics, Virtue, and Sustainable Living*,^{xviii} Melissa Lane speaks of virtues as a pre-requisite for human endeavours, she emphasizes virtues like justice, rational scrutiny and self-discipline, with the latter being the basis of all other virtues (116, 121). She highlights the individual agency and the role of the individual in shaping and transforming the ethical fabric of his or her society. She recapitulates^{xix}:

"In studying the history of ideas I have found one path ... in Plato's Republic (despite its several archaic and illiberal features). Plato reveals the part that each person plays, albeit shaped and sometimes deformed by power relations, in producing not only economic goods but also normative ones: society's order, justice and very sense of normality."

It is worth mentioning in this context the idea of innate knowledge, taken up again by Colin McGinn.^{xx} McGinn makes references to Descartes and Plato and, unsurprisingly, states that humans possess innate knowledge, i.e., not acquired through sense experience, logical, or algebraic precepts. The mind seems to have a substantial amount of innate structure or innate concepts - ideas of universals, engendered ultimately by evolution.

6. Conclusion

Already, the linguistic proximity of modern moral research to Cicero's expressions is striking, for instance:

- an innate moral faculty or the innate attributes of moral grammar, which are largely pre-determined by the inherent structure of the mind
- "pre-installed" moral "taste buds"
- development of moral intuitions about harm and fairness
- evolutionary ancient building blocks of morality
- the capacity to weigh moral options and to absorb moral rules
- formalizable deontic logic
- self-temperance (and regard for others) as one of the building blocks of morality
- the deployment of the concept of intent and causation even by very young children to differentiate between two acts
- moral intuitions about harm and fairness
- the inherent "moral toolkit" and the capacity to use and cultivate it in the social community, a community governed by reason, sound very much like the (Stoic) theory of moral development and universal virtues, espoused by Cicero
- the capacity for normative self-government and the correct use of this capacity as the highest level of morality (this again echoes Cicero's notion of exertion of reason)

Modern research suggests there are ubiquitous moral notions rooted in human social nature. Humans are born with an innate moral architecture; already, small children possess a pronounced sense of justice and naturally use it in its meaning as social glue, all ultimately in line with Cicero's views. The research further suggests that to develop this innate potential, careful nourishment and guidance are necessary. Put differently, correct reasoning according to particular values is crucial; it requires learning, guidance and a continuous exercise of reflective capacities. Modern research confirms morality is not an abstract, relative or even

obsolete concept; it is a set of particular rules and values, necessary to function and survive, as an individual and as a society.

As has been stated above, the classic "old" virtues are among others wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Cicero gives further examples in *The Laws*, Book I at (43):

"What room will there be for liberality, patriotism, and devotion; or for the wish to serve others or to show gratitude?"

In *The Republic*, Book VI Cicero describes the famous dream of Scipio - a meditation on values. It is the stoic "view from above," detached from the vanities of life, i.e., patriotism vs. fame, work ethic vs. pleasure, the continuous exertion of the mind and the disregard for the bodily affairs.

As aforementioned at (47) in *The Laws*, Book I, Cicero points to "the mother" of all vices and it is "pleasure which masquerades as goodness":

Cicero's "virtuous circle" is completed by the portrayals of a wise statesman and an active citizen. Cicero describes the ideal, wise statesman in *The Republic*, Book II at (69):

"Why, he should have virtually no duty apart from this, for it embraces all the rest - namely that he should never cease inspecting and examining himself, challenging others to imitate him, and by the splendor of his mind and conduct offering himself as a mirror to his fellow-citizens."

Consequently, Cicero concludes Book I of *The Laws* with the following portrayal of the ideal citizen at (60):

"... when he inspects and tests himself thoroughly he will see how well he has been equipped by nature on entering life, and what implements he has for acquiring and obtaining wisdom. At the beginning he will have conceived in his mind and spirit dim perceptions, so to speak, of everything. When these have been illuminated with the guidance of wisdom, he now realizes that he has the makings of a good man, and for that very reason a happy one.

Once the mind, on perceiving and recognizing the virtues, has ceased to serve and gratify the body, and has expunged pleasure like a kind of discreditable stain; and once it has put behind it all fear of pain and death, and entered a loving fellowship with its own kind, regarding as its own kind all who are akin to it by nature; and once it has begun to worship the gods in a pure form of religion, and has sharpened the edge of the moral judgement, like that of the eyes, so that it can choose the good and reject its opposite (a virtue which is called prudence from pro-vision) - what can be described or conceived as more blessed than such a mind?"

How does one acquire virtue? By means of education, teaching and learning, again, as postulated by Cicero. Julia Annas writes:

"What is involved in acquiring a virtue? As we have seen, the learning involved is not a matter of just doing what we are told; it requires coming to understand what you are doing. This starts between teacher and learner, and expands among our peers and our experiences in our culture ... Learning to be brave or loyal takes place in and among people who are engaged in becoming brave, or loyal, and thus in learning to think, talk, and react in certain ways. It is useful to think of this in terms of becoming a member of a community. People becoming brave will share certain reasons, feelings, and attitudes in a way that renders them distinctive, and can be thought of as forming a community of the brave. ... What is being picked out in the case of virtue from the skill analogy here is the shared community of activity and attitude. ... It is not a passive product of a string of impacts from outside; it is the way I (or you) an active creature, develops a character though formation and education."^{xxi}

And at (15) pointing the way ahead:

"Virtues, which are states of character, are states that enable us to respond in creative and imaginative ways to new challenges."

A life infused with insecurity, emptiness and anger, ruled by corrosive emotions and episodic satisfaction of instincts stands in strong contrast with the life postulated by Cicero:

- The potential to rise above the life driven by instincts and a purely hedonistic lifestyle, i.e. a life driven by values and purpose
- Reason and discipline as a road to spiritual freedom and accomplishment

- Ideally a life that disregards the “sensual” - an intellectual, spiritual life (to the extent that it is possible)

Just a fragment thereof entails overwhelming results. Cicero's words still merit attention.

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- ⁱ Roy F. Baumeister, *Meanings of Life* (The Guilford Press 1991) 105.
- ⁱⁱ *Ibid*, 105.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Neal Wood, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought* (University of California Press 1988) 70.
- ^{iv} Jed W. Atkins, 'Cicero on the relationship between Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*' in Anne Sheppard (ed), *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Republic* (Institute of Classical Studies, University of London 2013) 27.
- ^v Marcus Tullius Cicero, *The Republic and The Laws*, Translated by Niall Rudd (OUP 2008). All references to Cicero's *The Republic* and *The Laws* will follow this edition.
- ^{vi} Keimpe Algra, "Epictetus and Stoic Theology" in Theodore Scaltsas, Andrew S. Mason (ed), *The Philosophy of Epictetus* (Oxford University Press 2007) 38.
- ^{vii} *Ibid*, 39.
- ^{viii} Mark Tebbit, *Philosophy of law* (3rd edn, Routledge 2017) 10.
- ^{ix} Jill Harries, 'The Law in Cicero's writings' in Catherine Steel (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 116.
- ^x Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Vom höchsten Gut und vom größten Übel*, Translated by Otto Büchler (Anaconda 2012) 117 et seqq.
- ^{xi} Annas, 'Plato's Laws and Cicero's de Legibus' (n 9) 216.
- ^{xii} *ibid* 219.
- ^{xiii} Andrew R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus* (The University of Michigan Press 2007) 47.
- ^{xiv} John Mikhail, 'Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future' (2007) 11 *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 143.
- ^{xv} Joshua Rottman and Liane Young, "Mechanisms of moral development" in Jean Decety and Thalia Wheatley (ed), *The moral brain* (The MIT Press 2015) 123.
- ^{xvi} Frans de Waal, "The Tower of Morality" in Stephen Macedo & Josiah Ober (ed), *Primates and Philosophers* (Princeton University Press 2006) 161.
- ^{xvii} Christine M. Korsgaard, 'Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action' in Stephen Macedo & Josiah Ober (ed), *Primates and Philosophers* (Princeton University Press 2006) 98.
- ^{xviii} Melissa Lane, *Eco-Republic: What the Ancients Can Teach Us About Ethics, Virtue, and Sustainable Living* (Princeton University Press 2012).
- ^{xix} Melissa Lane, Plato can help us resolve the paradox of capitalism, *The Guardian*, 20 May 2009.
- ^{xx} Cf. Colin McGinn, *Inborn Knowledge* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2015).
- ^{xxi} Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford University Press 2011) 10, 54, 55.